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III.

Attorneys

The Changing Role of Outside Counsel: A
Proposal for a Legal "Audit"
Myron P. Curzan * and Mark L. Pdesh**
During the past several decades, the corporate governance debate has sur-

faced in many forms. Proposals for reform have addressed virtually every aspect
of the way corporations are governed and operated.I The roles of officers, directors, and accountants have been examined and, in some respects, materially

changed. 2

Codes of business conduct have been adoptedA

Most corporate

boards are now comprised of a majority of independent directors who have increased authority to monitor management and participate in long-range corpo-

rate planning.4 Committees of the board have proliferated and deal with
auditing, compensation, nominating, and social responsibility questions. 5 In particular, most major corporations now have audit committees composed of independent directors. 6 These committees work with the corporation's
independent accountants to assure the accuracy of financial reporting and the
adequacy of internal controls.
Demands for corporate accountability have also had ramifications for the

role of shareholders. The courts and the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) have expanded access to the annual proxy process for the presentation of
*
B.A., Columbia, 1961: M.A., Yale, 1962; LL.B., Columbia, 1965; Partner, Arnold & Porter, Washington, D.C.
**
B.A., Stanford, 1975; J.D., Yale, 1978; Associate, Arnold & Porter, Washington, D.C.
I Seegeneraly ALI-ABA COMMITTEE ON CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, COMMENTARIES
ON CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE (1979); Vagts, The Governance ofthe Corpora/ion. The Opltons
Available atid the Power to Prescribe, 31 Bus. Lxw. 929 (1976).
2 See geueralo' Gillerman, The CorporateFiduciag' UnderState Law, 3 CORP. L. RE'. 299 (1980); Kaplan,
Fiduciar, Responsibil o , in the jMdanagenent ofthe Corporation, 31 BUs. LAW. 883 (1976); Soderquist, Toward a
Mfore Eective Corporate Board." Reexamining Roles of Ouside Directors, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1341 (1977).
3 FOUNDATION OF THE SOUTHWESTERN GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BANKING, A STUDY OF CORPORATE ETHICAL POLICY STATEMENTS 6-9 (1980). Most large corporations have adopted such codes and
policy statements on conflicits of interest largely in response to the SEC's program for the voluntary disclosure of questionable payments. Fedders, Corporationson the Way to CleaningUp Their Act, Wash. Star, Feb. 3,
1980, § E, at 1, col. 2.
4

CONFERENCE

BOARD, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS:

PERSPECTIVES AND

PRACTICES IN NINE

COUNTRIES (1977). Considering former or retired employees as nonmanagement directors, the Conference
Board survey found that 84% of all American companies have a majority of outside directors. Considering
such employees as management directors, the survey found that 66% of all American companies have a
majority of outside directors. In contrast, a 1973 survey found these figures to be 77% and 62% respectively. CONFERENCE BOARD & AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CORPORATE SECRETARIES, INC. (ASCS), CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES: MEMBERSHIP AND COMMITTEES OF THE BOARD (1973).
5 CONFERENCE BOARD, supra note 4. See Green & Falk, Audit Committee-A Measured Contribution to
CorporateGovernance. A Realistic Appraisal ofI/s Objectives and Functions, 34 Bus. LAW. 1229 (1979); Mautz &
Newman, The Efective CorporateAudit Committee, 48 HARV. BUS. REV. 57 (1970); McMullen, Committees ofthe
Board of Directors, 29 Bus. LAW. 755 (1974).
6 The 1977 Conference Board survey found that 93% of all American companies have audit committees. The 1973 survey set this figure at only 45%. CONFERENCE BOARD & ASCS, supra note 4.
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shareholder proposals that have political, social, and economic significance. 7
These developments, together with other demands for corporate accountability,
may well be part of a general revitalization of the concept of corporate democracy.8
Counsel has a crucial role to play in improving corporate governance. The
presentation of independent and objective legal views to the board of directors is
essential to improving the quality of the board's performance. 9 Counsel may also
have a special ability to raise the level of ethical behavior in the corporation
irrespective of whether the corporation is in technical compliance with the law.'0
In any event, the SEC and those demanding corporate accountability have begun to focus on the lawyer's role in the governance of corporations. The muchdiscussed case of SEC v. NationalStudent Marketing Corp. II was only a harbinger of
reform proposals aimed at requiring counsel to take actions designed to improve
corporate governance and, in some cases, to disclose publicly corporate misconduct. 12
The fundamental issue presented by these reform proposals is how counsel's
role in improving corporate governance should be structured. An attorney's relationship to a corporation can take many forms. The most important and obvious
distinction is that between inside and outside counsel. All corporate counsel,
however, vary in their ability to influence the corporation they represent and in
the degree to which they are subject to the control of management.
There are two requisites to fashioning an effective role for counsel in improving corporate governance. The first of these is "capacity": Counsel must have a
grasp of the ongoing affairs of the corporation so that he will be in a position to
influence its governance. The second requisite is "independence": Counsel must
be sufficiently independent of management that he can confidently bring difficult legal and ethical problems before the board of directors.
The emergence of the corporate general counsel, largely over the last thirty
years, poses a dilemma as one seeks to satisfy these two requisites. The general
counsel of most major corporations is both a professional lawyer and an officer of
the corporation. Typically, he employs a number of outside law firms to work on
7 Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404
U.S. 403 (1972); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 12,999, 41 Fed. Reg. 52,994, 52,997 (1976).
8 See, e.g., Curzan & Pelesh, Revitalizing Corporate Democracy: Control of Investment Mtanagers' Voting on
Social Responsibiliy Proxy Issues, 93 HARV. L. REV. 670 (1979).
9 See Palmieri, The Lawyer's Role: An Argument for Change, 56 HARV. Bus. REv. 30 (1978).
10 Williams, CorporateAccountability and the Lawyer's Role, 34 Bus. LAW. 7 (1978); Address by Harold M.
Williams to the Eighteenth Annual Corporate Counsel Institute, Chicago, Illinois, The Role of Inside
Counsel in Corporate Accountability (Oct. 4, 1978).
11 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978) (since attorneys' failure to take steps to prevent merger based on
materially misleading financial information violated securities laws, unnecessary to determine if attorneys
had duty to disclose).
12 The most notable examples are the Petition for Rulemaking submitted by the Institute for Public
Representation [hereinafter referred to as Georgetown Proposal], Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release
No. 16,045, 44 Fed. Reg. 44,881 (1979); the Corporate Democracy Act of 1980 proposed by a coalition
surrounding Ralph Nader, M. GREEN, A. MARLIN, V. KAMBER & J. BERNSTEIN, THE CASE FOR A CORPORATE DEMOCRACY ACT OF 1980 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as GREEN & MARLIN]; and the Discussion Draft of the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct proposed by the
Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
(Discussion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980) [hereinafter referred to as MODEL RULES]. For a discussion of these
proposals, see the text accompanying notes 14-46 infra. See In re Carter &Johnson, [1979 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,175 (Mar. 7, 1979), rev'd, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 (Feb.
28, 1981); In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. Sec. L. REP. (CCH) 82,124
(rule 2(e) disciplinary proceedings).
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specific aspects of the corporation's legal problems while he and his staff address
the corporation's ongoing legal affairs. Thus, the lawyer who has the greatest
capacity for understanding the operations of the corporation-the general counsel-has the least independence because of his status as a member of management. The lawyer who has the greatest independence-the outside counsel-has
a reduced capacity for comprehending the full range of the corporation's legal
business because of his specialized role. This dilemma may be compounded by
corporate genan apparent trend toward expansion of the staff and duties of the
3
eral counsel and even more specialized use of outside counsel.'
This article will examine three proposals for structuring a role for counsel in
corporate governance-the Georgetown Proposal, the Corporate Democracy Act
of 1980, and the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. In our judgment, these proposals are all deficient in that they fail to
resolve the dilemma described above. As a result, the reforms they suggest have
the effect of attacking the underpinnings of the attorney-client relationship. As
an alternative to these reform efforts, the article proposes a regular legal review
or "audit" to be conducted by independent outside counsel. We believe that this
approach may offer a practical solution to the problem of defining the role of
attorneys vis-a-vis the corporations they represent.
I.

Proposals for Reform

On May 25, 1978, the Institute for Public Representation, a public interest
law firm affiliated with the Georgetown University Law Center, submitted its
first petition to the SEC for rulemaking on the responsibilities of attorneys to
help enforce compliance with the securities laws. That petition sought to amend
rule 2(e) 14 of the SEC's regulations to require attorneys, after first reporting to a
corporation's management and then to its board of directors, to reveal matters
involving securities frauds to the SEC.' 5 On November 22, 1978, the Institute
submitted a supplemental petition which modified and broadened the May 25
petition and requested the SEC to promulgate certain disclosure rules concerning
the relationship between counsel and SEC registrants.' 6 The SEC denied the
See generaly Ferrara & Steinberg, The Role of Inside Counsel in the Corporate Accountability Process, 4
L. REV. 3 (1981); Taylor, supra note 2.
17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1980).
The proposed rule stated:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that: (1) his client has, during the
course of representation, perpetrated a fraud upon any person or upon the SEC with respect to
any law administered or enforced by the SEC, shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the
same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected
person or to the SEC, except when the information is protected as a privileged communication
(as distinguished from a confidential communication); (2) a person other than his client has
perpetuated a fraud upon any person or the SEC with respect to any law administered or
enforced by the SEC, shall promptly reveal the fraud to the SEC. "Fraud" includes a material
misrepresentation or omission of material fact.
In calling upon the client to rectify the fraud, the lawyer shall bring the facts and legal
implications of the fraudulent conduct to the attention of management, including if necessary
the chief executive officer. If management does not take action considered by counsel to be
necessary to rectify the fraud, the lawyer shall bring the facts and legal implications of the
fraudulent conduct to the attention of the Board of Directors.
Supplemental Petition of the Institute for Public Representation for Rulemaking on the Responsibilities of
Corporate Counsel 5 (Nov. 22, 1978) (SEC File No. 4-210).
16 Id
13
CORP.
14
15
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May 25 petition, but published the November 22 petition for comment without
taking any position with respect to it. 17 Extensive critical comments on the
Georgetown Proposal were submitted, and the SEC denied the petition on April
30, 1980.18

The Georgetown Proposall9 as modified and broadened-would have imposed three requirements. First, it would have required corporations filing reports with the SEC to include in their annual reports on Form 10-K a certificate
stating that the board of directors had instructed every attorney employed or
retained by the corporation to report to the board certain corporate activities
discovered by the attorney which, in the attorney's opinion, violated or probably
violated the law. 20 The required certificate would also state that all attorneys for
the corporation had indicated their compliance by reporting the existence or absence of such violations, that the board had considered the attorneys' reports and
taken appropriate action, and that information on material violations of law had
been communicated to the corporation's independent auditors.'
Second, the Georgetown Proposal would have required reporting corpora17 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 16,045, 44 Fed. Reg. 44,881 (1979).
18 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 16,769, 45 Fed. Reg. 30,454 (1980).
19 The proposed rules stated:
1. Every corporation required to file reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("reporting corporation") shall include in its Form 10-K and in its annual report to shareholders a certificate stating that:
(A) Its board of directors has instructed each attorney employed or retained by the
corporation to report promptly to the board, either directly or through the audit committee
or some other committee of the board with a similar ratio of independent directors, any
corporate activities discovered by the attorney through reasonable diligence during the
course of representation which, in the attorney's opinion, violate or probably violate any
law administered or enforced by the SEC or any other law, where such violations or probable violations:
(i) Could result in material financial liability for the corporation;
(ii) Call into question the quality and integrity of management in connection
with corporate activity; or
(iii) Are part of a pattern or practice of recurring activity;
(B) All attorneys have indicated their compliance with the board's instructions either by reporting such violations or probable violations, or by reporting, at least annually,
that no such violations or probable violations have come to their attention;
(C) The full board of directors has considered each attorney's report and has taken
all actions determined to be appropriate;
(D) Information regarding such violations or probable violations has been conveyed
to the independent auditors if, in the opinion of the board, the violations or probable violations are material.
2. Every reporting corporation shall file with the Commission copies of written agreements delineating the relationship between the corporation and its outside attorneys. Such
agreements may cover any aspect of the relationship which, in the opinion of the corporation
might be of concern to stockholders and other investors, and, in any case, shall include:
(A) The frequency and nature of counsel's contacts with the corporation's board of
directors, general counsel, independent auditor, and chief executive officer; and
(B) Obligations of counsel with regard to corporate conduct which counsel considers
illegal or probably illegal.
3. When a reporting corporation's general counsel or any attorney retained in connection
with matters pertaining to the laws administered or enforced by the Commission resigns or is
dismissed, the corporation shall file with the Commission Form 8-K, describing the circumstances of the resignation or dismissal. Prior to submission of the Form 8-K to the Commission
the corporation shall provide the resigning or dismissed attorney with an opportunity to comment on the accuracy and completeness of the description. The attorney's comments shall become part of the corporation's submission to the Commission.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 16,045, 44 Fed. Reg. 44,881 (1979).
20 Id § I(A).

21 Id § I(B)-(D).
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tions to file with the SEC copies of written agreements describing the relationship
between the corporation and its outside counsel and the obligations of counsel
22
with regard to discovery of illegal conduct.
Third, the Georgetown Proposal would have required reporting corporations to file with the SEC a report on Form 8-K whenever the corporation dismissed its general counsel or one of its securities lawyers. 23 The report would
have followed the SEC's practice with respect to dismissal of a reporting corporation's independent auditors..2 4 The Institute defended the Georgetown Proposal
on grounds that it would improve the flow of information to the board, especially
to independent directors; clarify the relationship of attorneys to the corporation;
and protect investors, shareholders, and the public by minimizing the likelihood
25
of unlawful corporate conduct.
The Georgetown Proposal inspired a section of the Corporate Democracy
Act of 1980 proposed by a coalition of members of Public Citizen's Congress
Watch, the Council on Economic Priorities, and the Building and Construction
Trades Department of the AFL-CIO. 26 The proposed act comprehensively addresses the structure and operation of large corporations. 2 7 Section 107 of the
proposed act follows the first section of the Georgetown Proposal in prescribing
that a corporation's counsel should report corporate activities that violate the law
28
to a special committee of the board.
A number of commentators raised a variety of objections to these proposals.2 9 It was argued that existing internal corporate reporting systems are adequate 30 and that rulemaking would be inopportune when the legal profession is
considering internal reform through revision of the Code of Professional Responsibility.3 ' It was also argued that the proposals would strain the attorney-client
relationship and stifle the exchange of information between corporations and
22 Id § 2.
23 Id §3.
24 This requirement is contained in Item 4 of Form 8-K, adopted pursuant to § 13 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (1980).
25 Comments of the Institute for Public Representation in Response to Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16,045 at 2-3 (Nov. 30, 1979) (SEC File No. 4-210).
26 GREEN & MARLIN, supra note 12, at 44-45. The activities of the coalition culminated in a "Big
Business Day" on April 17, 1980.
27 For example, it would require greater shareholders' rights and an independent constituency board
of directors representing not only shareholders but also consumers, employees, environmentalists, and
other groups. Id at 9-14. It would also mandate increased corporate disclosure, 24-month notification
prior to the closing of a plant, and restitution to victims of hazardous corporate conduct. Id. at 14-19, 24.
28 Section 107 states:
The Board shall certify that it has instructed all lawyers and auditors on salary or retained
by the firm to report to the Law Compliance Committee any conduct by the firm that they
consider to be illegal or probably illegal if the illegality a) would result in material financial
liability to the company, b) call into question the quality and integrity of management, c) are
part of a recurring practice, or d) involve significant harm to consumers.
Id at 12.
29 The objections to the Georgetown Proposal are summarized in Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Release No. 16,769, 45 Fed. Reg. 30,454 (1980). See also Blomquist, Corporate DisclosuresoflRelationships 1"ith
Counsel.- A Conrnentlon Recent SEC Proposals, 61 CHI. B. REC. 230 (1980); Burke, The Du o of Confudentialit and
Disclosing CorporateAisconduct, 36 Bus. LAW. 239, 273-75 (1981); Gross, Attorneys and Their CorporateClients:
SEC Rule 2(e) and the Georgetown "Whistle Blowing" Proposal, 3 CoRP. L. REV. 197 (1980); SEC Corporate
Counsel Proposals Draw Fire, 66 A.B.A.J. 31 (1980).
30 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 16,769, 45 Fed. Reg. 30,454 (1980); Gross, supra
note 29.
31 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 16,769, 45 Fed. Reg. 30,454 (1980).
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their counsel. 32 Inhibiting the flow of information would in turn increase the
possibility of corporate wrongdoing. Finally, the Georgetown Proposal was criti33
cized as ambiguous, impractical, and too costly.
These objections to the proposals are well taken. An additional criticism is
that the proposals fail to distinguish between inside and outside counsel. In imposing reporting obligations on all of a corporation's counsel irrespective of the
nature of their relationship to the corporation, the proposals fail to recognize that
inside and outside counsel have different capacities for influencing corporate governance and different degrees of independence from management.
In response to criticisms that the proposals would undermine the attorneyclient relationship, the proponents of both proposals denied that they would create "whistleblower" obligations or breach the attorney-client privilege. 34 It is
difficult to see how reporting to the board would not be regarded as
"whistleblowing," at least by the member of management whose activities are
reported. In any event, the proposals could have a more significant, albeit indirect, "whistleblower" effect, since such reporting might be held not responsive to
a request for legal advice and hence not protected by the attorney-client privilege
in ensuing litigation. 35 Moreover, communicating the report to the corporation's
independent accountant would most likely prevent assertion of the privilege. 36
Neither the Georgetown Proposal nor the Corporate Democracy Act of 1980
shows proper sensitivity for the "confessor" role that counsel should and must
play in relation to his clients. 3 7 Imposing an ongoing obligation upon counsel to
report "probable" violations of law would strip the lawyer of this role, chill com32 Blomquist, supra note 29; Gross, supra note 29; Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 16,769,
45 Fed. Reg. 30,454 (1980).
33 Gross, supra note 29; Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 16,769, 45 Fed. Reg. 30,454

(1980).
34 Comments of the Institute for Public Representation in Response to Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16,045 at 3 (Nov. 30, 1979) (SEC File No. 4-210); GREEN & MARLIN, supra note 12, at 44-45.

35 See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950) (privilege
applies if communication "relates to a fact ofwhich the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without
the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal
...). Ensuing litigation would be likely if the
services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding.
corporate misconduct were serious.
The Supreme Court of the United States recently broadened the application of the attorney-client
privilege in the corporate setting in Upjohn Co. v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 677 (1981). The Court rejected the narrow "control group test," which extended the privilege only to communications between
counsel and those in the control group of the corporation, but refused to sanction a different test for the
application of the privilege. The Court emphasized that the Upjohn employees communicated with corporate counsel for the purpose of securing legal advice. Id at 685. Even though Upjohn dealt with communications between lower echelon employees and counsel, the Court's analysis will likely govern whether
the attorney-client privilege applies to an attorney's "whistleblowing" communications to the board of
directors. To qualify for that protection under Upjohn, it appears clear that the communication must be
responsive to a request for legal advice. See Note, The Implications of Upjohn, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW, 887

(1981).
36 See FTC v. TRW, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 160, 163 n.7 (D.D.C. 1979), afd, 628 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir.
1980); Attorney Gen. of the United States v. Covington & Burling, 430 F. Supp. 1117, 1121 (D.D.C. 1977).
37 See Hazard, An HistoricalPerspective on the Attomre-Client Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1061 (1978).
Judge George Sharswood, generally accepted as the progenitor of the Canons of Ethics, see Lorne, The
Corporateand Securities Adviser, the Public Interest, and Professional Ethics, 76 MICH. L. REV. 425, 430 (1978),
compared the legal profession to the "sacred ministry" and stated that "the great duty which the counsel
owes to his client is an immovable fidelity." G. SHARSWOOD, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 50 (1854). See also
Note, The Attome-Client Privilege-Identi/fingthe Corporate Client, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281 (1980); Note,
Applicability of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Corporate Communications, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 819 (1979); Note,
Conflicting Standardsfor Applying the Corporate Attorne-Client Privilege, 33 VAND. L. REV. 999 (1980).
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munication between attorney and client, and thus undermine the goal of achieving greater corporate compliance with the law.
The SEC denied the Georgetown Proposal in part because the proposed revision of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility "may provide further guidance concerning the professional responsibilities of corporate counsel."' 38 The
Model Rules therefore take on added significance to the structuring of a role for
39
counsel in corporate governance.
The Model Rules take an approach similar to, although less categorical
than, the Georgetown Proposal and the Corporate Democracy Act. The two
rules of principal relevance to the problem presented are rules 1.7 and 1.13.40
Rule 1.7 governs treatment of a client's confidences in general. 4 1 Subsection (a)
prohibits disclosure of information about the client where the information is confidential, except as provided by subsections (b) and (c). Subsection (b) compels
disclosure of information where it is necessary to prevent the client from committing an act resulting in death or serious bodily harm to another or where disclosure is compelled by law or the rules of professional conduct. Subsection (c)
permiis disclosure in order to prevent or rectify a "deliberately wrongful act" by
the client, except where the lawyer has been employed after the act has been
42
committed to represent the client concerning the act.

38 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 16769, 45 Fed. Reg. 30,454 (1980).
39 Debate in the ABA House of Delegates on the Model Rules was scheduled for February 1981 but,
in light of extensive criticism of the Rules, debate was put off. See Subin, War over Client Confden/la/ily: i
Defense of the Kutak Approach, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 19, 1981, at 22; Burke, supra note 29, at 282-94; Ferrara &
Steinberg, supra note 13, at 15-19.
40 Rule 3.1, MODEL RULES, supra note 12, at 59, which deals with attorney candor toward a tribunal,
and rule 4.2, id at 88, which addresses attorney behavior in negotiations, also have some relevance to the
problem of disclosure of corporate misconduct.
41 Rule 1.7 provides:
(a) In giving testimony or providing evidence concerning a client's affairs, a lawyer shall
not disclose information concerning the client except as authorized by the applicable law of
evidentiary privilege. In other circumstances, a lawyer shall not disclose information about a
client which relates to the client-lawyer relationship, which would embarass the client, which is
likely to be detrimental to the client, or which the client has requested not be disclosed, except
as stated in paragraphs (b) and (c).
(b) A lawyer shall disclose information about a client to the extent it appears necessary to
prevent the client from committing an act that would result in death or serious bodily harm to
another person, and to the extent required by law or the Rules of Professional Conduct.
(c) A lawyer may disclose information about a client only:
(1) For the purpose of serving the client's interest unless it is information the client
has specifically requested not be disclosed;
(2) To the extent it appears necessary to prevent or rectify the consequences of a
deliberately wrongful act by the client, except when the lawyer has been employed after
the commission of such an act to represent the client concerning the act or its consequences ...
Id at 21-22.
42 The lawyer's duty not to reveal past wrongs becomes unclear where the wrong is continuing. This
problem is especially acute in the securities area where failure to disclose material past wrongs in registration statements, proxy statements, and the like may be a new or future wrong. Seegeneral Hoffman, On
Learning ofa Corpora/e Clieni's Crine or Fraud--he Lawyer's Dilemma, 33 Bus. LAW. 1389, 1402-03 (1978).

The comments to rule 2.3 suggest a resolution to an ambiguity surrounding the exception to rule
1.7(c)(2). The comments state:
When the client's course of action has already begun and is continuing, the lawyer's responsibility is especially delicate. The lawyer is not required to reveal the client's wrongdoing,
except where necessary to avoid additional serious consequences. See Rule 1.7. However, the
lawyer is required to avoid furthering the purpose by suggesting, for example, how it might be
concealed.
MODEL RULES, supra note 12, at 56-57. The comments thus suggest that a continuing wrong may be
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Rule 1.13 deals specifically with disclosure of the confidence of a corporate
client. 43 Subsection (a) reiterates that the lawyer represents the entity rather
than any of the corporation's constituent elements. Subsection (b) suggests certain measures counsel might take upon discovering a legal violation. These
measures are asking reconsideration of the matter, seeking a separate legal opinion, and referring the matter to higher authority including, if necessary, the
board. In determining the appropriate measure, counsel is adjured to consider a
number of factors, including the seriousness of the legal violation, its consequences, and the scope of his representation. Counsel is also supposed to minimize "disruption" and the disclosure of client confidences. In the event the
board does nothing about the violation of law, subsection (c) authorizes counsel
to take remedial action, including disclosure.
A technical problem posed by the Model Rules is that the relationship between rules 1.7 and 1.13 is unclear. Does rule 1.13 qualify rule 1.7 so that disclosure of corporate client confidences is restricted to violations of law as specified
by rule 1.13? Or does rule 1.13 supplement rule 1.7 in the sense that it is one of
the rules referred to in rule 1.7 which permits lawyers to disclose information as
44
permitted by law or the rules of professional conduct?

A more fundamental problem is that the Model Rules do little more than
restate the problem of how counsel can improve corporate governance and, more
specifically, of when he should report or disclose corporate wrongdoing. The
Model Rules list factors and lay down permissive guidelines, but considerations
such as the seriousness of the violation and the likelihood of harm to the corporation are well known, especially to counsel confronted with the problem of potential corporate misconduct. The different levels of authority to which counsel may
appeal are also all too well known. To the extent they lay down a general rule
requiring reports and disclosures for all corporate counsel, the Model Rules are
revealed pursuant to rule 1.7. The practical consequence of this view is that corporations may be unable
to obtain counsel in securities matters where they most need legal advice.
43 Rule 1.13 provides:
(a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization as distinct from its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders, or other constituents.
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee, or other person associated with the organization is engaged in or intends action, or a refusal to act, that is a violation
of law and is likely to result in significant harm to the organization, the lawyer shall use reasonable efforts to prevent the harm. In determining the appropriate measures, the lawyer shall give
due consideration to the seriousness of the legal violation and its consequences, the scope and
nature of the lawyer's representation, the responsibility in the organization of the person involved, and the policies of the organization concerning such matters. The measures taken shall
be designed to minimize disruption and the risk of disclosing confidences. Such measures may
include:
(1) Asking reconsideration of the matter;
(2) Seeking a separate legal opinion on the matter for presentation to appropriate
authority in the organization;
(3) Referring the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if necessary, referral to the highest authority that can act in behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.
(c) If, despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b), the highest authority
that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a
violation of law and is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer may
take further remedial action, including disclosure of client confidences to the extent necessary, if
the lawyer reasonably believes such action to be in the best interest of the organization.
MODEL RULES, supra note 12, at 40-41.
44 See Burke, supra note 29, at 289-90.
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subject to the same infirmities as the Georgetown Proposal and the Corporate
Democracy Act: Different capacities for influencing corporate governance and
different degrees of independence are not recognized. Although the Model Rules
are appropriately deferential to the attorney-client relationship, they still would
require abandonment of the attorney's role as "confessor."
The Georgetown Proposal, the Corporate Democracy Act and the Model
Rules all seek to impose upon counsel obligations akin to those of an independent
financial auditor.45 Although the model of lawyer as auditor is not irrational, it
is a significant departure from the model of lawyer as confidant. 413 Most of the
criticisms of these proposals stem from this departure. Although the model of
lawyer as auditor can be useful in establishing a role for counsel in improving
corporate governance, this result can only be fashioned if the model is formulated
in a more limited and structured fashion.
II.

A Proposal for a Legal "Audit"

One of the most significant changes in corporate governance in recent years
has been the increase in the number and responsibilities of audit committees of
the board. 47 The SEC has long urged the formation of such committees. 48 In
1967, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants recommended the
appointment of committees composed of ouside directors to nominate the corporation's independent auditor and to review the auditor's work. 4 9 Such committees would discuss with the auditor the scope of his examination, review the
auditor's report, direct supplemental audits if necessary, determine that the auditor had received all information requested, and invite the auditor's recommendations. 50 The auditor would bring to the audit committee's attention any
significant questions concerning the company's financial statements that had not
been satisfactorily resolved at the management level. 5 1 The audit committee
would then take the matter to the board of directors with a recommendation for
action. In the absence of satisfactory action by the board, the auditor would
52
decide whether to take an exception in his opinion or resign.
53
Subsequently, the SEC again endorsed the concept as did the New York
Stock Exchange 54 and the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws. 55 The SEC has
45 See generaly Sommers, The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer, [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,631 at 83,689-90.
46 See Lorne, The Corporate and Securities Adviser, the Public Interest, and Professional Ethics, 76 Mici I. L.
REv. 425, 466-75 (1978).
47 See note 6 supra; Green & Falk, supra note 5; Mautz & Neuman, supra note 5.
48 SEC Accounting Series Release No. 19, 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,020 at 62,107-108 (Dec. 5,
1940); SEC Accounting Series Release No. 123, 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,145 (Mar. 23, 1972); SEC
Accounting Series Release No. 126, 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
72,148 (July 5, 1972).
49 AICPA, AICPA Executive Committee Statement on Audit Committees of Boards of Directors, 124 J. AcCOUNTANCY 10 (Sept. 1967).
50 Id
51

Id

52 Id
53 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 9,548, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 78,670 (Mar. 23, 1972).
54 See [19731 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 232 at A-21.
55 ABA CoMMIrrEE ON CORPORATE LAWS, SECTION OF CORPORATION, BANKING & BUSINESS LAW,
CORPORATE DIRECTOR'S GUIDEBOOK 29-30, 32-33 (rev. ed. 1978).
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now approved a New York Stock Exchange rule5 6 that requires, as a condition
57
for listing, all domestic companies to establish independent audit committees.
Using these precedents on the role of auditors and audit committees as a
guide, the American Bar Association and the corporate sector should consider
adopting a comparable approach for dealing with the problem of the relationship of counsel to the corporation he represents. Each corporation should consider appointing a special committee of the board of directors with responsibility
to oversee that corporation's compliance with governing legal requirements.
This committee would engage outside counsel on a periodic, perhaps annual,
basis to review the significant legal affairs of the corporation. 58 This "auditor"
counsel should not have had a prior "non-auditor" relationship to the corporation. The "auditor" counsel would meet with the corporation's general counsel
and his staff and other outside counsel retained by the corporation for specific
matters. These attorneys to the corporation would be obligated to make relevant
materials available to the "auditor" counsel. "Auditor" counsel would also review various corporate transactions and meet with a range of corporate officials
and employees. The "auditor" counsel would then report to the special committee of the board. In the event that signficant legal problems were uncovered, the
special committee would be obligated to report to the board with a recommendation for action.59
This type of legal review process would have a number of salutary effects. It
would increase the likelihood that significant legal problems would come to the
attention of both management and the directors of corporations. This "highlighting effect" would occur for two reasons. On the one hand, management and
inside counsel would know that if they attempted to avoid presenting significant
issues to the board, they would face the embarrassing predicament of having
"auditor" counsel discover the problem. Thus, their inclination would be to
bring these issues to the board's attention. On the other hand, in the press of
day-to-day corporate affairs management and inside counsel may not fully perceive the significance of potential legal issues. An "auditor" counsel review process would provide a significant check on questionable management decisions
and establish a secondary review on what matters are brought to the board's
attention.
This proposal would also increase the flow of information to corporate directors. By incorporating an independent legal review as well as an independent
financial audit into the corporate governance process, directors would have
56

See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 15,570, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.

81,959 at 81,393 & n.6 (Feb. 15, 1979).
57 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 13,346 (Mar. 9, 1977). The SEC also amended its
rules to require disclosure in proxy statements of the existence or absence of audit committees. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-101, Item 6(d)(1) (1980).
58 To establish a workable scope for the review, the committee's engagement of the "auditor" counsel
should specify that counsel's role is to investigate the significant areas of legal exposure of the corporation
and the significant potential legal problems it faces.
59 The concept of a legal "audit" has been suggested as a stop-gap to relieve SEC-generated pressure
for disclosure of corporate wrongdoing and prosecution of corporations and their officers. Pickholz, Confronting SEC Pressure: A Aeedfor Legal Audits, Legal Times of Wash., Oct. 29, 1979, at 14, col. 1. Although
that proposal provides a useful starting point, it does not address the corporate governance issues that
underlie demands for corporate accountability. For example, it does not resolve the "audit" counsel's role
vis-a-vis the hoard of directors. See also FTC's Model Antitrust Compliance Audit Program, Legal Times of
Wash., Aug. 27, 1979, at 18, col. 1.
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greater assurance that they were obtaining the salient facts about the corporation. This type of audit process would obviate the need for proposals that corporate boards be provided with staffs to help them monitor corporate
60
management.
This approach offers the additional benefit of clarifying the role of both inside and outside counsel to a corporation. Corporate counsel represents the corporation as a whole, and therefore has a duty to bring serious legal issues to the
attention of the board of directors. 6 ' The "auditor" counsel approach pragmatically addresses the realities of the ongoing management-counsel relationship. If
counsel is to play a major role in guiding the corporation's day-to-day affairs and
is to serve as a corporate "confessor," then he must be trusted by management.
To foster management's trust, the natural inclination of almost all corporate
counsel is to temporize and to down-play the significance of legal issues; to find
answers at the operational level and not to direct these issues to the board of
directors. In our experience, corporate counsel tends not to seek out problems
that may require reference to the board and disclosure to the public.
The "auditor" counsel approach eases this problem for corporate attorneys.
To the extent that counsel does not raise issues at the board of directors level, his
actions are subject to another level of scrutiny. It is the "auditor" counsel who
has final responsibility for ensuring that important matters are brought to the
attention of the corporation's board. Such counsel will place a new check on the
current balance between management and the board.
The "auditor" counsel approach directs the resolution of serious legal
problems to the board of directors-where it should reside. The board should
know the significant issues facing the corporation and should make the decisions
resolving them. The proposed approach provides increased assurance to the corporate policy-makers that information will reach them. Of equal importance, it
puts pressure on the board to deal with that information. Although any reports
of "auditor" counsel would presumably be privileged-since they would constitute responses to a communication from the client for legal advice 6 2 -they would
still require action by the board. If the board failed to act it would probably face
the prospect of "auditor" counsel's resignation. This should have the same deterrent effect as does the resignation of a corporation's financial auditors.
In any event, the adoption of this proposal by the American Bar Association
and the corporate community would help eliminate proposals for direct or indirect "whistleblowing" by corporate counsel to the public. Corporations cannot
operate efficiently if their regular counsel cannot play the role of "confessor" and
adviser. When corporate management and the board of directors fail to act in
the face of illegal corporate behavior, then counsel should resign. 6 3 Any revela60 See general'y Goldberg, Debates on Outside Directors, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1972, § 3, at 1, col. 3; McMullen, supra note 5; Wilde & Vancil, Performance Audits by Outside Directors, 50 HARv. Bus. REV. 112

(1972).
61 At least two corporations, Connecticut General Insurance and Mead, have adopted policies that
require the general counsel to report significant legal and ethical problems to the board or to the audit
committee. Palmieri, supra note 9, at 44.
62 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 677 (1981) (employee responses to counsel's investigation
held privileged where communications were made at direction of corporate superiors in order to secure
legal advice).
63 Kramer, Clients' Frauds and Their Lawyers' Obhgations. A Study in Professional Irresponsibiity, 67 Gao.
L.J. 991 (1979).
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tions or confessions to the public or to regulatory agencies should come from the
corporation's board of directors or management.
III.

Conclusion

Many proposals have been advanced relating to the role of counsel in the
corporate setting. Unfortunately, these proposals do not address the two requisites to counsel playing an effective role in corporate governance. Instead, they
deny the inherent tension between the "capacity" requirement-that information must become available to the general counsel if he is to be effective-and the
"independence" requirement-that counsel's utility will be reduced if he is perceived as an investigator or watchdog to a corporation. The proposal for "auditor" counsel set forth in this article substantially reduces these problems by
introducing to the process a new participant whose responsibilty would be to
ferret out difficult legal and ethical issues. The proposal should permit regular
counsel to perform a more customary counseling role.
If there is any significant disadvantage to this approach, it is that the proposal would increase current corporate auditing costs. We submit that any response
to the growing demands for corporate accountability must involve some cost.
Far more detrimental would be the absence of any response at all by the corporate community. In the long run such a refusal to deal with an existing problem
might be the most costly approach of all, since it could lead to further losses of
public confidence in the corporate sector and eventually to intrusive and inefficient government regulation.

